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Abstract The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and
Woodward (Philosophical Review 97(3):303–352, 1988) was meant to help account-
ing for scientific practice, especially in relation with scientific theory testing. Their
article and the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal to philosophy of
science. We shall argue that the data/phenomena distinction can be used much more
broadly in modelling processes in philosophy.
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1 Introduction
The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward
(1988) was meant to help accounting for scientific practice, especially scientific the-
ory testing. Their article and the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal
to philosophy of science. In this paper, we apply their distinction to the general tech-
nique of conceptual modelling, a widespread methodology that is also employed in
philosophy. Distinguishing between data and phenomena will allow us to shed some
light on a number of philosophical and metaphilosophical issues: it provides for a
stance from which one can assess the status of empirical methods in philosophy, and
it helps to distinguish between good and bad uses of the technique of conceptual
modelling in specific arguments employed in analytical philosophy.
In Sect. 2, we give a general overview of the technique of conceptual modelling with
some examples. In Sect. 3, we introduce our main metaphilosophical issue, viz., the
fundamental difficulty that practitioners of philosophy face when doing “philosophy
of X”, e.g., philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, or the philosophy of
time: they have to walk a thin line between two methodological dangers, the Scylla of
mere armchair philosophy and the Charybdis of essentially becoming sociologists of
X . In the context of conceptual modelling, we can give a precise description of these
two perils.
After that, in Sect. 4 we provide a recapitulation of the distinction between data and
phenomena and show how it captures some fine structure of the method of conceptual
modelling. In order to illustrate the general usefulness of making the data/phenomena
distinction in philosophy, we give a case study from epistemology and connect to
the 1950s discussion about ordinary language philosophy. We then formulate specific
lessons for the current debate about the use of experiments and intuitions in philosophy.
Finally, in Sect. 5, we provide our answer to the questions raised in Sect. 3. By using
the detailed analysis of potential problems generated by confusing data and phenom-
ena, we propose a means of charting the waters between Scylla and Charybdis, and
analyse why the modeller sometimes runs into Scylla and sometimes is swallowed by
Charybdis.
2 Conceptual modelling
In science and engineering, mathematical modelling has long been seen as one of the
most fundamental methodologies and its scope is perceived as growing:
Nowadays, mathematical modelling has a key role also in fields such as the
environment and industry, while its potential contribution in many other areas is
becoming more and more evident. One of the reasons for this growing success is
definitely due to the impetuous progress of scientific computation; this discipline
allows the translation of a mathematical model [ …] into algorithms that can be
treated and solved by ever more powerful computers. (Quarteroni 2009, p. 10)
Mathematical modelling thus presupposes quantitative and computational methods.
However, a slight generalization of the same methodology is ubiquitous also in
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non-quantitative research areas. In analogy to mathematical modelling, we call this
more general technique conceptual modelling.1 Conceptual modelling is an iterative
process through which a stable equilibrium is reached between a concept or a collec-
tion of concepts as explanandum and a (somewhat) formal representation of it.2 Each
iteration towards the equilibrium involves three steps:
1. Formal representation. Guided by either some initial understanding of X or the
earlier steps in the iteration, one develops a formal representation of the explan-
andum.
2. Phenomenology. With a view towards step 3, one collects evidence in the range
of the explanandum that is ideally able either to corroborate or to question the
current formal representation.—We call this step “phenomenology” because it is
generally broader than mere data collection; this will become important below,
and will be discussed in Sects. 4 and 5.
3. Assessment. In the light of the results from step 2, one assesses the adequacy of
the representation. If this assessment is positive, the modelling cycle is left—no
further iteration is necessary since an equilibrium has been reached. Otherwise,
the representation has to be changed, and a new iteration is started at step 1.
This method obviously covers mathematical modelling as employed in the sciences
and in engineering, where the formal representation typically comes with a numerical
mathematical model that allows for quantitative predictions. In this case, the phe-
nomenology step consists of quantitative experiments and/or observations. Another
instance of modelling is given by the iterative schemes of parameter fitting that are often
employed in data analysis, where something like the above procedure is implemented
in the form of concrete algorithms. In that case, the phenomenology step involves, e.g.,
the computation of a “goodness of fit” measure (based on the discrepancy between
the given data points and the current parameterized model) that is then assessed in
order to decide whether convergence has been reached, or whether a new iteration
with updated parameters is necessary. It can also be illuminating to describe historical
episodes in the sciences in terms of the modelling paradigm, when assessment in the
light of new data leads to theory change. As an illustration, one may consider Kepler’s
two successive theories of planetary orbits, only the second of which (incorporating
what is now known as “Kepler’s laws”) survived assessment in the light of Brahe’s
astronomical observations (Kuhn 1957). History also provides us with striking exam-
ples of the use of conceptual modelling in non-quantitative contexts—consider, e.g.,
Ventris’s deciphering of Linear B starting with the faulty theoretical assumption that
1 The use of the word “modelling” calls to mind the debate about theories and models in philosophy
of science. This overlap in terminology may be somewhat unfortunate, but first, the entrenchment of the
term “mathematical modelling” does not allow another choice of phrase, and secondly, calling the method
“modelling” is also adequate from the point of view of that debate, since stressing that one is just after a
model does not suggest deep metaphysical involvement. Cf. our remarks about logical analysis (which does
suggest such involvement) below, note 3.
2 When speaking of “formal representation” here, we wish to leave it open whether this representation just
employs some predicate-logical symbolization with a view towards regimented natural language, uses a
formal language such as the language of modal logic, or specifies a mathematical model of some sort.
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the language was not related to Greek (Chadwick 1990). And in philosophy, modelling
is a useful generalization of the paradigm of “analysis”, as we shall lay out below.
The modelling paradigm is also broad enough to cover two opposite stances with
respect to the aim of theory construction: should a theory just account for given obser-
vations, or is some deeper insight aimed at? In this debate about “saving the phe-
nomena”, one camp joins Osiander’s preface to Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus in
viewing the aim of theory construction to be the establishment of a model that simply
reproduces what is observable, thus yielding, in Duhem’s words,
[ …] a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of
principles, which aim to represent as simply and completely, and exactly as
possible, a set of experimental laws. (Duhem 1906, p. 19)
At the other end of the spectrum, one may demand models that are not just empiri-
cally, but somehow also structurally appropriate in the sense of capturing the essence
of what they are models of. No matter how this demand can be spelled out explicitly—
within our modelling paradigm it clearly refers to a standard of assessment (step 3)
that differs from the one in place in the “saving the phenomena” camp.
We already stated that the method of conceptual modelling is not confined to the
sciences, nor to quantitative methods. In the case of philosophy one should also note
that conceptual modelling is more general and more dynamical than the prominent
method of “conceptual analysis”. For an overview of this method, we refer the reader
to Beaney (2008).3 The wider scope of conceptual modelling vis-à-vis conceptual
analysis is important, e.g., when it comes to the debate about the use of intuitions
in philosophy, which we shall address in Sect. 4.3. Thus, in his defense of the use of
intuitions in philosophy against some positions of experimental philosophy, Ernest
Sosa writes:
It is often claimed that analytic philosophy appeals to armchair intuitions in the
service of “conceptual analysis”. But this is deplorably misleading. The use of
intuitions in philosophy should not be tied exclusively to conceptual analysis.
Consider some main subjects of prominent debate: utilitarian versus deontolog-
ical theories in ethics, for example, or Rawls’s theory of justice in social and
political philosophy [ …]. These are not controversies about the conceptual anal-
ysis of some concept. [ …] Yet they have been properly conducted in terms of
hypothetical examples, and intuitions about these examples. (Sosa 2007, p. 100)
All the philosophical debates that Sosa mentions as falling outside the scope of con-
ceptual analysis do fall under the scope of the more general technique of conceptual
3 The well-known distinction between “theory” and “model” in philosophy of science (cf. note 1) is
approximately reflected in the distinction between “conceptual analysis” and “conceptual modelling”. At
least on a certain reading, analysis is meant to render an initially imprecise and vague problem in its ‘true’
logical form via the reduction of natural language to formal logic. On the other hand, the technique of
conceptual modelling makes no claims about the relationship between the model and the described concept
other than adequacy in the context at hand, thus staying closer to the rôle of models in science.
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modelling. The use of intuition can therefore be addressed more adequately within
that framework.4
Let us add a disclaimer at this point: Even though conceptual modelling is broader
than conceptual analysis, we do of course realize that conceptual modelling is not the
only method of philosophy. There are philosophical argumentation techniques that will
not fit into our general scheme. Our claim is just that conceptual modelling is wide-
spread enough to guarantee that understanding the metaphilosophical implications
and details of this particular philosophical technique will greatly advance our under-
standing of philosophical practice in general—even if some aspects of philosophical
methodology are not covered.
3 “What is a philosophy of X?”
One of the hardest methodological challenges in philosophy is to give an account of
what one is doing in establishing a “philosophy of” something that is already there.5
Philosophical theory building often starts out with a normative agenda, which threat-
ens to lose touch with what the theory is to be about. On the other hand, a purely
descriptive approach can be criticised for failing to be distinctively philosophical. Is
there a safe passage for “philosophy of X”, generally, between the Scylla of normative
subject-blindness and the Charybdis of merely descriptive non-philosophy?
One can fruitfully read the historical development of philosophy of science in the
twentieth century as a searching party in these difficult waters. Broadly speaking, phi-
losophy of science as a separate subfield of philosophy started out from the movement
of logical empiricism in the 1920s. In their denial of metaphysics, these philosophers
only acknowledged a formal reconstruction task for philosophy, as stated forcefully
by Carnap:
Philosophie betreiben bedeutet nichts Anderes als: die Begriffe und Sätze der
Wissenschaft durch logische Analyse klären. (Carnap 1930, p. 26)6
Carnap would certainly reject as metaphysical the suggestion that the aim of logical
analysis—and thus, on his view, of philosophy—should be to capture the essence of
science. But logical analysis demands more than “saving the phenomena” in terms
of a description of actual scientific practice: it is meant to give a rational reconstruc-
tion, not just a description, of such practice.7 Thus, philosophy of science started out
dangerously close to Scylla, as a purely normative enterprise in which logical meth-
ods were employed to build up a reconstructed version of science without any direct
4 Kuipers (2007) also stresses the fact that in analytical philosophy and especially in philosophy of science,
a method broader than (static) conceptual analysis is often employed. He discusses this fact in the con-
text of a broadening of the understanding of the method of explication originally proposed by the logical
empiricists. Our framework of conceptual modelling is broader than the notion of explication, but shares
its dynamical nature.
5 A subcase of this challenge is the so-called “paradox of analysis”; cf. again Beaney (2008).
6
“To pursue philosophy means nothing but: clarifying the concepts and sentences of science by logical
analysis.”
7 Cf. our remarks in notes 1 and 3 above.
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link to science as actually practiced.8 The historical turn that philosophy of science
took in the 1960s pushed the field towards the other extreme. While close attention
to actual scientific practice was certainly a necessary corrective moment, critics saw
philosophy of science dissolve into history or sociology. In the meantime, however,
philosophy of science seems to have settled for a healthy compromise between the
two extremes: historical case studies and sociological findings are generally taken
seriously, but philosophy of science has not collapsed into history or sociology. These
disciplines are rather seen as informing the field by providing material for philosophi-
cal reflection. While it would be an overstatement to claim that there was a universally
accepted methodological agreement as to the importance of such empirical input, there
is clearly a consensus among philosophers of science that good philosophical work
needs to steer a course between a merely normative and a merely empirical approach.
Overall it seems that we have here a success story of establishing a “philosophy of X”
in one specific case. Can this be generalized?
In the case of a philosophical approach using the method of conceptual modelling,
one can already identify Scylla and Charybdis in the three step process described above:
by the way in which the phenomenological step (step 2) is performed, a philosopher
decides how close he or she wants to maneuver towards either of the dangers.
An extreme case of armchair philosophy would base the phenomenology solely on
introspective truth, using just the philosopher’s own intuition as basis for the following
assessment step—if such a step is performed at all. Especially if the philosopher is not
an expert of X , this is steering dangerously close to Scylla, as one may be losing touch
with the subject of investigation at issue. On the other hand, an empirically based
approach will involve a data collection step that will provide a description of human
behaviour with respect to X . However, how do we guarantee that this gives us more
than just a description of human behaviour? How do we salvage the philosophical
content of our theory?
The current debate about the use of empirical methods in philosophy, under the
heading of experimental philosophy, can usefully be described in our framework: it
shows a normative (“armchair”) and a descriptive (“experimental”) camp pulling in
different directions, corresponding to different ideas as to what a sound phenomenol-
ogy step in conceptual modelling should look like. We shall address this debate in
more detail in Sect. 4.3 below, making use of the data/phenomena distinction.
4 Data vs. phenomena in science—and in philosophy
Bogen and Woodward (1988) famously distinguish data—local, situated facts—from
phenomena—the empirical material against which theories are tested:
8 The matter is of course more diverse than this brief sketch suggests. For one thing, there were other
historical developments that added to what became philosophy of science as we know it—one only has
to think of the French school initiated by Poincaré. And on the other hand, as Uebel (2001) and Nemeth
(2007) point out, the “left wing” of the Vienna circle itself, one of the birthplaces of logical empiricism,
didn’t just incorporate Carnap’s movement of logical reconstruction, but also Neurath, who was much more
open to sociological investigations—closer to the “saving the phenomena” attitude indeed; but then, closer
to Charybdis, too.
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Data, which play the role of evidence for the existence of phenomena, for the
most part can be straightforwardly observed. However, data typically cannot
be predicted or systematically explained by theory. By contrast, well-developed
scientific theories do predict and explain facts about phenomena. Phenomena
are detected through the use of data, but in most cases are not observable in any
interesting sense of that term. (Bogen and Woodward 1988, p. 305f.)
Bogen and Woodward show through a number of case studies that the step from data
to phenomena is indeed crucial for scientific practice, and that specific local skills—
knowledge of possible confounding factors or about the quirks of individual scientific
instruments—are needed to make that step. In their simplest case study, they take up
an example that Ernest Nagel, a defender of the normative approach to philosophy of
science of the 1950s, discusses in his influential book The Structure of Science (Nagel
1961, p. 79): measuring the melting point of lead. Nagel suggests that the sentence
“lead melts at 327◦C” is a statement about an observation. Bogen and Woodward
show, however, that an individual observation of a sample of lead’s melting first needs
to be put into its local context, a requirement reminiscent of the traditional hermeneu-
tical rule of “sensus totius orationis” or “semantic holism”.9 Without going into the
details, making one such observation in a laboratory involves a number of technical
and subjective factors that are crucial for the interpretation of the resulting single data
point. Many such observations pooled together may allow one to infer to the existence
of a stable phenomenon, which would then be expressed by the given sentence, “lead
melts at 327◦C”. It is this phenomenon that, e.g., a quantum-mechanical model of the
crystal structure of lead would have to explain—and not a single thermometer read-
ing, which may be influenced by, e.g., draught in the laboratory because of someone’s
entering and opening the door. A skilled experimenter knows about such and other
confounding factors (in one case Bogen and Woodward cite, involving the experi-
menter’s boss’s heavy steps on the stairwell), and takes them into account prudently
when inferring to the existence of phenomena. Ex post it may well be possible to
capture such effects systematically via appropriate mini-theories describing a certain
class of observational effects, and anticipating them appropriately is a prerequisite
of good experimental design. The structure of the actual lab work however always
remains open for all kinds of unforseen interventions, and accordingly, there is no
formal recipe for the step from data to phenomena.
We claim that the data/phenomena distinction makes sense not just within philos-
ophy of science, but in all cases in which the technique of conceptual modelling is
employed. The distinction allows one to discern some fine structure within the phe-
nomenology step, which is not just a step of data collection. The actual work (the
empirical work in the lab, the historical work in the archive, the sociological work
with questionnaires or interviews—but also armchair introspection) indeed just leads
to data: idiosyncratic local facts. However, from these, stable and reproducible phe-
nomena have to be distilled in order to be put up against the theory at issue in the
9 Cf. (Scholz 2001, p. 71) or (Bühler and Cataldi Madonna 1996); e.g., “ein Wort hat nur eine Bedeutung
keinen Sinn, ein Saz (sic) an und für sich hat einen Sinn aber noch keinen Verstand, sondern den hat nur
eine völlig geschlossene Rede” (Schleiermacher 1838, p. 41).
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modelling cycle.10 A phenomenology step that leaves out this move amounts to mere
data collection—it is incomplete and can lead to a wrong assessment.
Before we move on to employ the data/phenomena distinction in addressing the
general question about “philosophy of X” discussed in the previous section, we shall
now illustrate its usefulness via two short case studies. We shall first show how the
distinction can be used in epistemology by addressing the question of the factivity
of knowledge (Sect. 4.1). Secondly, we shall comment on a specific discussion about
ordinary language philosophy in the late 1950s (Sect. 4.2). More generally, we will then
point to some lessons for the proper place of intuition and experiment in conceptual
modelling (Sect. 4.3).
4.1 Empirical questions in epistemology
Many central questions of epistemology center around the concept of knowledge: what
knowledge is, which knowledge we have or can acquire in which circumstances, and
how knowledge relates to truth, belief, and justification. It seems obvious that there is a
link between these questions and empirical facts about knowledge attributions, which
may be specific utterances of “X knows that p”. After all, philosophers are interested
in the concept of knowledge because people think and talk about knowledge—if we
had no use for knowledge attributions, the field of epistemology probably wouldn’t
be there. Also quite plausibly, the socially acknowledged attribution of knowledge of
p to X would appear to be a good guide as to whether some person X actually knows
some p. Surely the link will not be strict—people make mistakes, and there can be
pragmatic factors bringing about non-literal uses of such attributions (after all we
know that “Can you pass the salt?” isn’t a question about physical ability either). But
if socially acknowledged attribution of knowledge was systematically talking about a
phenomenon (sic!) different from knowledge, why wouldn’t philosophers investigate
that concept instead? Shouldn’t there at least be some link between the utterances and
the philosophical theory?
The debate about such a link is rather fierce. Some epistemologists favour a com-
pletely normative and a priori approach to knowledge that would not acknowledge the
relevance of actual usage—cf., e.g., Hazlett (2009) for an overview. In this camp, the
nature of knowledge is held to be fixed by philosophical theory derived via an armchair
method based on singular intuitions and introspection. Actual knowledge attributions
are then assessed pragmatically, i.e., for cases in which philosophical epistemology
and actual use differ, a pragmatic rule is invoked to explain the discrepancy. Such a
philosophical analysis is in danger of becoming revisionist philosophy of knowledge
by claiming that knowledge assertions in natural language are not about the concept
called “knowledge” in philosophy, but about some other concept that happens to be
called the same in natural language. According to this extreme view, native speakers
using the verb “to know” are referring to this other concept, and their usage has no
bearing whatsoever on epistemology. At the other extreme, a purely empirical analysis
10 In fact, phenomena usually play a double rôle in modelling: from the theory, one derives predicted
phenomena which can then be compared with the phenomena derived from the data, and any discrepancy
here will be important for the third modelling step of assessment.
123
Synthese (2011) 182:131–148 139
of the natural language usage of “to know” clearly loses its philosophical component
and becomes a mere description of speaker behaviour.
Let us illustrate this opposition by the question of the factivity of knowledge, i.e.,
the question of whether one can know only that which is true. Most a priori philosoph-
ical theories of knowledge hold on to this principle, while some contextualist theories
deny it. It is a plain empirical fact that people sometimes use knowledge attributions,
and apparently felicitously, in a way that denies the factivity of knowledge.11 What
are we to make of this?
From the point of view of conceptual modelling, it becomes clear that we are here
confronted with a debate about the phenomenology step of modelling and about its
assessment. Proponents of an a priori theory of factive knowledge may downplay
the importance of the empirical material by pointing out that people are sometimes
confused about the concepts they employ (which is certainly true), by giving an alter-
native, pragmatic reading of the knowledge attributions under consideration, or by
simply insisting that such examples are philosophically irrelevant. Proponents of a
more descriptive approach, on the other hand, may remain unimpressed and point to
the undeniable empirical data, accusing the apriorist of an isolating strategy and of
reliance on a single data point gathered via introspection.
In this debate, the data/phenomena distinction can be employed to do more jus-
tice to both sides, and perhaps to advance the state of the discussion. (We refrain
from taking sides here.) The facts that the descriptivists point to are first and fore-
most data—observable, but local and idiosyncratic facts that do not have the status
of theoretically relevant phenomena yet. A further step is necessary here—and even
internal consistency of the data after averaging out random errors isn’t enough: there
can be systematic, not just random errors in data collection.12 Let us thus assume
that knowledge of p was attributed to X in a certain situation (this already demands
a certain interpretation of the words uttered, since irony, play-acting etc. have to be
excluded), and that nobody complained even though p was false. Let us assume that
a number of such data have been accumulated. When can we infer from there to an
epistemologically relevant phenomenon of non-factivity of knowledge?
We pointed out above that the move from data to phenomena is one that requires
skill and acquaintance with the local idiosyncrasies of the data. For the case at hand this
means that one will have to pay close attention to the local circumstances in which
the data (the knowledge attributions) were recorded. The main confounding factor
is the possibility of a pragmatic reading of the knowledge attribution. If in a given
case a recorded knowledge attribution has a pragmatic explanation—and there are
such cases—, then it will not corroborate the phenomenon of non-factive knowledge.
One should however observe that the onus of proof in such cases is on the normative
11 Hazlett (2009) gives the example “Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doc-
tors in the early 80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection”, saying that this sentence
“does not strike ordinary people as deviant, improper, unacceptable, necessarily false, etc.”. Further exam-
ples along these lines are easy to find. For some empirical evidence for the non-factive use of “to know” in
mathematical practice cf. Müller-Hill (2009) and Löwe et al. (2009).
12 E.g., in measuring the melting point of lead, one might be using a wrongly calibrated thermometer,
or consistently misjudge the visual signs of melting. To repeat, the step from data to phenomena isn’t
automatic.
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theoretician. As Austin (1956) knew, ordinary use may not have the last word, but it
does have the first.
Generalizing from the specific example, we see that an a priori approach can be
correct in criticizing purported empirical refutations of a philosophical theory by sin-
gle cases and in dismissing them as reports of idiosyncratic usage. This holds good
as long as the empiricists have not identified phenomena but are merely relying on
data. As soon as a stable and philosophically relevant phenomenon is identified that
challenges the a priori theory, however, the empiricist has a valid point against the
theory.
4.2 On the phenomenological basis of ordinary language philosophy:
Mates vs. Cavell in 1958
In this subsection, our topic is the question of the nature of the factual foundation of the
ordinary language philosophy of the 1950s. We shall discuss the debate between Mates
(1958) and Cavell (1958).13 In the 1950s, much of analytic philosophy had taken a lin-
guistic turn towards ordinary language, apparently following Wittgenstein’s maxim,
“Denk nicht, sondern schau!”. The idea was that many philosophical problems should
be resolvable through analysis of language as ordinarily practiced—after all, Wittgen-
stein had also taught that philosophy was language’s going on holiday.14 Reverting to
ordinary use should thus expose many philosophical problems as spurious.
If this is to be the method of philosophy, one obvious question is where the facts
about ordinary use come from. Benson Mates (1958) asks this question and argues
that an empirical approach is necessary: statements about ordinary use are empirical
statements and as such should be addressed, e.g., by the methods of empirical lin-
guistics.15 Stanley Cavell (1958), Mates’s co-symposionist at the 1957 APA Pacific
meeting from which both papers ensued, however claims that it is a mistake to view
such statements as straightforwardly empirical. According to him, a native speaker has
a form of access to facts about ordinary use that is different from and philosophically
much more pertinent than nose-counting.
One of Mates’s main points—to which, as far as we can see, Cavell has no direct
response—is that the philosophical access to the pertinent facts seems to lead to incom-
patible results. It may be worth quoting at length; the context of the discussion is an
assessment of Ryle’s claim that (most of) the problem of free will comes from disre-
garding the ordinary use of the term “voluntary”, which according to him only really
applies to “actions which ought not to be done” (Ryle 1949, p. 69). Mates comments:
[T]he intuitive findings of different people, even of different experts, are often
inconsistent. Thus, for example, while Prof. Ryle tells us that “voluntary” and
“involuntary” in their ordinary use are applied only to actions which ought not
13 We should like to thank Jim Bogen for drawing our attention to this material.
14
“Philosophische Probleme entstehen, wenn die Sprache feiert” (Wittgenstein 1953, para. 38).—The
“don’t think, but look” maxim is from para. 66.
15 Mates in fact envisages at least two methodological ways of accessing such facts, cf. (Mates 1958,
p. 165). We shall not go into any detail here.
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to be done, his colleague Prof. Austin states in another connection: “… for
example, take ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’: we may join the army or make a
gift voluntarily, we may hiccough or make a small gesture involuntarily …”
If agreement about usage cannot be reached within so restricted a sample as
the class of Oxford Professors of Philosophy, what are the prospects when the
sample is enlarged? (Mates 1958, p. 165)
Well, how should this question about ordinary use be resolved—and what is the proper
methodological place of statements about ordinary use in philosophical arguments
anyhow?
Again, our main point here is not to try and resolve these questions, but to point
to the usefulness of the data/phenomena distinction in modelling. Statements about
ordinary use are first and foremost data. This holds no matter whether such state-
ments are established by empirical investigation (be it nose-counting or interactive
interviews) or by armchair introspection exposing intuitions. What is needed in the
iterative scheme of conceptual modelling, on the other hand, is stable phenomena.
The question of how and when given data may be used to infer to the existence of
phenomena is, as always, a delicate one. As in the epistemology case from Sect. 4.1,
empirical data about usage may be open to pragmatic maneuvers that explain away
observed linguistic behaviour as not pertinent to a given philosophical question. And
it is true that a competent speaker of a language, as a member of the community whose
practice it is to speak that language, has a special access to that practice that allows him
or her to say “we do it like this” that may not need empirical support—Cavell (1958)
gives a detailed exposition of this view. One should however acknowledge the method-
ological pluralism that is now standard in linguistics: according to Karlsson’s (2008),
“grammatical intuition [ …] is accessible by introspection, elicitation, experimental
testing, and indirectly by observation of language data”. In this way, conflicting native
speakers’ intuitions can be resolved by collecting more data from various sources—a
standard move in inference to the existence of phenomena in the sciences (Bogen
and Woodward 1988). As in the lab, so in philosophy, data only make sense if their
local context is properly taken into account, and the touchstone for theories consists
of phenomena, not of data.
4.3 On the proper place of experiment and intuition in conceptual modelling
The discussion between Mates and Cavell outlined in Sect. 4.2 is a precursor of a
current and very intense metaphilosophical debate about the rôle of intuition and
experiment in philosophy. In the last section, we linked the discussion from the 1950s
to the data/phenomena distinction, and similarly, we can also locate it as a crucial but
neglected factor in the current debate, at least for philosophical approaches in the par-
adigm of conceptual modelling—which covers a great part of the locus of the current
metaphilosophical debate; viz., analytical philosophy.
In the mentioned debate, we find two opposed camps whose extremes correspond
roughly to Scylla and Charybdis from Sect. 3. Situating the discussion explicitly within
the conceptual modelling framework and insisting on the data/phenomena distinction
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will help us to identify what is going on in this debate and to develop criteria for
assessing whether a use of intuition or experiment is problematic or not.
Experimental philosophers have attacked the use of intuition and introspection,
claiming that these are too much dependent on external factors to be philosophi-
cally relevant. To take just one example, Weinberg et al. (2001) describe a cluster of
empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions (e.g., “Epistemic intuitions vary from
culture to culture”) and then argue that “a sizeable group of epistemological projects
[ …] would be seriously undermined if one or more [ …] of [these] hypotheses about
epistemic intuitions turns out to be true” (Weinberg et al. 2001, p. 429). They then pro-
vide empirical data that suggests that these hypotheses are in fact true.16 In general,
some experimental philosophers believe that intuitions are only “suited to the task
of providing an account of the considered epistemic judgements of (mostly) well-off
Westerners with Ph.D.’s in Philosophy” (Bishop and Trout 2005, p. 107).
Critics of experimental philosophy read this as a complete denial of the philo-
sophical relevance of intuition. Against this they stress the fact that sometimes the
experimentally observed disagreement is merely verbal and not substantive (Sosa
2007, p. 102), that “dialogue and reflection” rather than singular and possibly idiosyn-
cratic introspection have “epistemological authority” (Kauppinen 2007, p. 113)17 and
that “intuitions involve the very same cognitive capabilities that we use elsewhere”
(Williamson 2004, p. 152).
In slightly differing ways, both Sosa and Williamson stress the analogy between
the philosophical use of intuitions and other methods of scientific endeavour:
[I]ntuition is supposed to function [ …] in philosophy [ …] by analogy with the
way observation is supposed to function in empirical science. (Sosa 2007, p. 106)
Metaphilosophical talk about intuitions [ …] conceals the continuity between
philosophical thinking and the rest of our thinking. (Williamson 2004, p. 152)
We believe that the discussion about the rôle of intuition and experiment in philoso-
phy can benefit from the two methodological points that we have argued for in this
paper. First, viewing philosophical arguments as cases of conceptual modelling helps
to understand the rôle that intuition or experiment are supposed to play: they constitute
part of the phenomenology step. Sosa and Williamson in their respective ways are right
in stressing the analogy with the sciences here. Second, making the data/phenomena
distinction helps to see that there is nothing wrong with intuition, nor with experiments,
16 As just one example, they tested a Gettier-style story (similar to the ones discussed in Sect. 5.1 below)
about Jill driving an American car on Western and East Asian test subjects. While the Western subjects
agreed with the mainstream philosophical opinion that no true knowledge exists in a Gettier-style sit-
uation, the majority of East Asian subjects disagreed (Weinberg et al. 2001, Sect. 3.3.2). For further
results concerning dependence of intuitions on the order of presentation of stories, cf. also Swain et al.
(2008).
17 Kauppinen (2007) also criticizes the experimentalists for using non-participatory questionnaire methods.
Note that there are other, qualitative and participatory methods of the social sciences that may be better and
more reliable ways of inferring philosophically relevant phenomena. Of course, experimental philosophers
are to blame if they do not employ the full richness of methods available in the empirical social sciences.
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as such.18 Both are methods for arriving at data: local, idiosyncratic facts. Introspec-
tion at first tells us only something about the intuitions of one particular human being,
the philosopher; similarly, experiments give us data about particular individual human
beings. It is the move to stable phenomena that makes all the difference. Both intuition
and experiment are problematic if the assessment step of modelling uses just data and
not stable phenomena, or if the distinction is not made at all.19
It is interesting to note that the discussion about intuition in philosophy has its direct
cognate in the meta-discussion in linguistics where the rôle of native speaker intuitions
about grammaticality has been questioned.20 While looking at this analogy, it should
strike the philosopher as interesting that native-speaker intuition in linguistics is a
different concept from the philosopher’s intuition in many examples of analytic phi-
losophy: we already quoted Karlsson’s (2008) point about the multiple accessibility
of grammatical intuition. Using native-speaker intuitions in linguistics is methodo-
logically sound because they can be corroborated as phenomena rather than data by
elicitation and testing. The problem with philosophical intuition is that very often this
seems to be not the case—and papers such as Weinberg et al. (2001) (even if one may
be sceptical about their methodology) show that there is a problem. If one is not able
to identify a phenomenon behind the intuitions one refers to—and such a phenome-
non has to be stable across cultural differences to be philosophically relevant—, then
something is amiss.
5 Assessing instances of conceptual modelling
In Sect. 3, we discussed the Scylla of divorcing philosophy of X from X and the Cha-
rybdis of transforming philosophy of X into an empirical analysis of human dealings
with X . From our discussion, it is clear that philosophy of X , when conducted in the
style of conceptual modelling, will have to maneuver between these two perils in all
three modelling steps. This provides us with a kind of checklist for assessing instances
of conceptual modelling in philosophy.
1. Formal representation. In this step one has to strive for a representation that is
properly philosophical—not just any representation of aspects of X will do. What
counts as properly philosophical, or as philosophically interesting, also has to do
with the historical development of the subject of philosophy. As is well known,
what now is physics used to be philosophy a few hundred years ago. Nowadays,
when one envisages, e.g., a philosophy of matter, many questions will just be
outside of the scope of a philosophical representation and threaten to move one
into the whirlpools of Charybdis.
18 In this assessment we thus join the balanced view of Symons (2008).
19 For a clear example of running the two together, cf. Kauppinen (2007). Grundmann (2003) asks for
broadening the range of data to be used in philosophy (“die Datenbasis [ …] erweitern”, p. 50). Our point is
that it isn’t the amount of data but data that allow for the isolation of stable phenomena, which makes the
crucial difference.
20 Cf. Schütze (1996), Sect. 2.4, entitled “Introspection, Intuition and Judgment”, which starts with a quo-
tation by Raven McDavid: “Being a native speaker doesn’t confer papal infallibility on one’s intuitive
judgements”.
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2. Phenomenology. Especially in this step, the two mentioned dangers both pose a
genuine threat. Collecting phenomena without philosophical relevance will push
the modeller away from the field of philosophy, while failing to collect phenom-
ena in the field of X will cause the modeller to falter at the rock of Scylla. The
latter can happen in two different ways: either by collecting phenomena that fall
outside of the scope of X , of, even worse, by failing to infer stable phenomena
from the data about X that one has collected.
3. Assessment. The dangers in this step are related to those of the previous step. Mis-
taking data for phenomena, or failing to make the distinction, is widespread in
philosophy, leading to a premature end of the modelling cycle. In many instances,
the assessment step is even lacking altogether, which means that the cyclical nature
of modelling is not taken seriously.
As an application of our methodological results, we shall now look at cases of good
and bad conceptual modelling by discussing the phenomenology step of three well-
known philosophical arguments. This will allow us, finally, to comment on a certain
feeling of dissatisfaction with current analytic philosophy.
5.1 Stopped clocks and bogus barns
The question of whether knowledge is (nothing but) justified true belief, has been
addressed by a number of philosophers. One purported example of justified true belief
that is not knowledge, dating from before the famous paper of Gettier (1963), is by
Russell:
There is a man who looks at a clock which is not going, though he thinks it is,
and who happens to look at it at the moment when it is right; this man acquires a
true belief as to the time of day, but cannot be said to have knowledge. (Russell
1948, p. 170f.)
This example plays its rôle in the phenomenology step of modelling the concept of
knowledge. If it points to a true phenomenon of justified true belief without knowl-
edge, then knowledge cannot be (nothing but) justified true belief. How are we to
assess this case?
In the case of a stopped clock, we have stable natural language intuitions. Clocks
stop all the time, and we deal with such situations in everyday life. Telephone calls and
e-mail discussions across several time zones give us experience in handling temporal
shift and subtle linguistic means of dealing with the fact that the subjective time for
different speakers may be different. This experience in turn allows us to confidently
claim intuitions in the case of a stopped clock. In this case, thus, an appeal to natural
language intuition (“cannot be said to have knowledge”) is enough to infer to the exis-
tence of the relevant phenomenon. In the larger context of modelling knowledge, this
means that the theory at issue is refuted and that a new modelling cycle has to begin.
In epistemology, many other examples of justified true belief without knowledge
have been discussed, but not all of them are equally well supported. Consider
Goldman’s (or Ginet’s) bogus barn example:
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Henry is driving in the countryside with his son. [ …] Suppose we are told that,
unknown to Henry, the district he has just entered is full of papier-mâché fac-
similes of barns. These facsimiles look from the road exactly like barns, but are
really just facades, without back walls or interiors [ …] Henry has not encoun-
tered any facsimiles; the object he sees is a genuine barn. But if the object on
that site were a facsimile, Henry would mistake it for a barn. Given this new
information, we would be strongly inclined to withdraw the claim that Henry
knows the object is a barn. (Goldman 1976, p. 772f.)
Again, our natural language intuitions (“we would be strongly inclined …”) are
invoked before he background of a hypothetical situation. Goldman’s data point stands:
he would not say that Henry has knowledge in that case. Are we allowed to make the
step to the existence of the relevant phenomenon here, too?
This case seems to be more doubtful—too much depends on fine details of the
story. In the given story, Henry has just entered fake barn country, he sees a real barn;
why shouldn’t he know it is one? Contrast this with a case in which he has already
been misled (unknowingly); our intuitions may shift. In a well-conducted instance of
conceptual modelling, this situation should prompt us to look for more data to cor-
roborate the phenomenon in question. Typically, an experiment might be called for at
this stage—or the switch to a different example, like Russell’s, which leads one to a
relevant phenomenon more directly.21
5.2 Mad pain and Martian pain
On the way to making a point about the mind-body problem, David Lewis opens his
paper on “Mad pain and Martian pain” as follows:
There might be a strange man who sometimes feels pain, just as we do, but
whose pain differs greatly from ours in its causes and effects. Our pain is typ-
ically caused by cuts, burns, pressure, and the like; his is caused by moderate
exercise on an empty stomach. Our pain is generally distracting; his turns his
mind to mathematics, facilitating concentration on that but distracting him from
anything else. [ …] [H]e feels pain but his pain does not at all occupy the typical
causal role of pain. He would doubtless seem to us to be some sort of madman
[ …]
I said there might be such a man. I don’t know how to prove that something is
possible, but my opinion that this is a possible case seems pretty firm. If I want
a credible theory of mind, I need a theory that does not deny the possibility of
mad pain. (Lewis 1983, p. 122)
Lewis thus introduces the possibility of mad pain and goes on to use it as a touchstone
for a theory of mind, he speaks of “the lesson of mad pain” being an argument against
21 For Goldman, the Gettier nature of the case is only one of the relevant aspects, which is why Russell’s
example wouldn’t be enough for the purpose of his paper.
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functionalism (p. 123). In so doing he treats that possibility as a phenomenon. We may
grant that already the possibility, not just the actual existence, of a case of mad pain
has intriguing consequences for the philosophy of mind, as Lewis claims. Within our
modelling framework, we can however also assess how successful Lewis has been in
establishing the existence of the phenomenon in question. He states that he doesn’t
know “how to prove that something is possible”—read: how to establish the possibility
of something as a phenomenon. Now clearly there are established methods for this
task; medieval philosophers already knew that ab esse ad posse valet consequentia.
Lewis however does not point to an actual case, or even just to a case that is relevantly
similar. Instead he argues in favour of his supposition from the fact of his “pretty firm”
conviction of the possibility in question; he later repeats that he is concerned here
with his “naive opinions about this case” (p. 129). Lewis thus brings forward a piece
of data—and a relevant one too. However, by this he has not succeeded in establishing
the phenomenon that he needs for his argument against functionalism. Since Lewis in
the mentioned article gives no further support for the possibility that he presupposes,
his argument should be rejected as methodologically unsound—which, of course, is
not the same as rejecting its conclusion.
5.3 Dissatisfaction with current analytic philosophy
Having assessed a few ‘first-level’ philosophical arguments from the methodological
perspective provided in this paper, we also mean to provide a (partial) explanation of
why some philosophers may think that current analytic philosophy is taking a wrong
turn. We can discern and explain two reasons. First, a substantial amount of research
results is negative, consisting in the refutation of theories of other people. This is
to some extent built into the method of conceptual modelling, which is falsification-
prone: any model can be challenged by more data, and challenging the model of a
different researcher is easier than coming up with your own model. Secondly, how-
ever, the negative image of such research has another, more problematic source: the
refutations of theories of other philosophers often involve counterexamples piled on
top of each other in thought-experiments dealing with fictitious universes populated
with bizarre creatures and objects, such as Martians deploying M-rays (Mele 2003,
Chap. 2), zombies (Chalmers 1996), twin earthlings (Putnam 1975), or watchful angels
with a dislike for particular glassware (Johnston 1992). Many people feel that they
are losing their grip on what such examples can prove, and would generally question
the merit of science fiction in philosophy.22 Our analysis allows us to go beyond this
vague feeling of dissatisfaction with such thought-experiments, and explain why cer-
tain cases are unproblematic and others correspond to a faulty phenomenology step.
The data—i.e., that some philosopher is convinced by a certain story and another
isn’t—can be acknowledged, no war about personal intuitions need be fought. The
important question is, rather, whether from such stories we may infer not just to data,
but to phenomena.
22 Remember that Wittgenstein went for Westerns.
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